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THE UNEASY PLACE OF PRINCIPLE IN
TORT LAW
George C. Christie*
his article is about the instinctive urge of lawyers to find some co-
herent and self-contained logical structure in the law. Sir Edward
Coke asserted, for example, that the common law is "an artificial
perfection of reason, gotten by long study, observation, and experience."'
Coke, in turn, was attacked by Thomas Hobbes as being a proponent of
what in our time would be called "sterile formalism."' 2 Nevertheless,
throughout history the notion that the common law represents the appli-
cation of general principles in some non-formalistic sense to the decision
of concrete cases has continued to capture the imagination of the legal
profession. Of course, the intensity of the urge to find principles at the
core of legal development waxes and wanes in any given area of the law
at any given time and, in some areas of the law, it is greater than it is in
others. There have always, however, been skeptics. It is no mere hap-
* James B. Duke Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law, Durham, N.C. I
am honored to have been asked to contribute to this issue of the SMU Law Review honor-
ing the memory of my friend, former colleague, and sometime co-author (Presumptions
and Assumptions in the Criminal Law: Another View, 1970 DUKE L.J. 919), Ken Pye. The
present essay is a revised and somewhat expanded version of a paper that was published in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW (Oxford Univ. Press, 1995) that was edited
by David Owen, a former student of Mr. Pye and mine. I wish to thank Jane Stapleton and
Martin Stone for their careful reading of early drafts of this essay and for their many help-
ful comments.
1. 1 SIR EDWARD COKE, SYSTEMATIC ARRANGEMENT OF LORD COKE'S FIRST INSTI-
TUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND §§ 97b, 183b (J.H. Thomas ed., 1836) [hereinafter FIRST
INSTrrTUTE]. Expanded, the quote reads:
Reason is the life of the law, nay, the common law itself is nothing else but
reason; which is to be understood of an artificial perfection of reason, gotten
by long study, observation, and experience, and not of every man's natural
reason; ... And therefore, if all the reason that is dispersed into so many
several heads, were united into one, yet could he not make such a law as the
law of England is; because, by many successions of ages, it hath been fined
and refined by an infinite number of grave and learned men ....
The First Institute was of course a commentary on Littleton on Tenures. In the "new ar-
rangement," by J.H. Thomas in 1818, of the First Institute, the quoted material appears as
the first paragraph of Book I, Chapter I.
2. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 147-48 (Ernest Rhys ed., 1914). Hobbes attacks
Coke's assertion, in First Institute § 709, that a person who flees to avoid a felony persecu-
tion, but is subsequently acquitted of the felony, must nevertheless forfeit his goods be-
cause the law does not permit him, in the forfeiture proceedings, to challenge the
presumption of guilt raised by his initial flight. Hobbes makes the same criticism in his A
Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England, in 6 THE
ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES OF MALMESBURY 136-37 (Sir William Molesworth
ed., 1840).
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penstance that one of the most frequently cited statements in all of legal
literature is Holmes' aphorism that "[tlhe life of the law has not been
logic: it has been experience."'3
In the last thirty years, there has been an increased interest among
scholars, judges, and practicing lawyers concerned with the law of torts to
find the principles that underlie that law. Sometimes, as with some in the
law and economics school, the endeavor starts out as an attempt to dis-
cover the principles that can organize legal experience and explain the
decision of actual cases even if those principles were not (even "uncon-
sciously") in the minds of the judiciary. An example is the claim that the
law of negligence can be explained on the assumption that the law is
seeking to achieve the more efficient allocation of society's resources.4
Of course, it is only a small step from the observation that the cases can
be usefully organized around such a principle to the conclusion that, if
not consciously, at least "unconsciously," judges were actually motivated
by such a principle. From there it is only another small step for a propo-
nent of economic efficiency, as the key to legal development, to put forth
the normative claim that judges should be motivated by such a principle.
There are other principles, however, which start out from the beginning
as being primarily normative principles, even if it is thought that they also
serve an explanatory purpose. Recent experience brings to mind a
number of such normative principles that have been urged upon the pro-
fession by scholars and judges. If someone were to remark that most of
these instances seem to be examples of the Duke of York marching ten
thousand men up a hill only to march them down again, such a person
would not be alone.5 To see why someone might be tempted to make this
observation, it will be useful to examine some of these well-known recent
attempts to subject the law of torts to the discipline of principles. This is
what I propose to do after a few preliminary remarks, which will clear the
way for the central part of the discussion.
I. SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE USES OF
PRINCIPLE IN TORT LAW
It is of course necessary to recognize that, even if one can agree on an
appropriate principle, one still has to determine the exact canonical for-
mulation of that principle, as well as how that principle should be applied
to concrete fact situations. By themselves these are not insurmountable
objections to the appeal to principle. I advert to these possible objections
to make clear from the outset that it shall be no part of my thesis to claim
3. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
4. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972); see also
Parts I and II of RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1972).
5. See David Howarth, Negligence after Murphy: Time to Rethink, 50 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 58, 87 (1991), an article that used a shortened version of this old saw. Howarth's
article is primarily concerned with the state of negligence law after recent developments,
many of which I will discuss below, rather than with the normative status of principle that
is the focus of this paper.
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that they are. For example, in McDougald v. Garber,6 the New York
Court of Appeals enunciated the principle that, in order to recover for
loss of enjoyment of life-which the court considered a subcategory of
pain and suffering-the injured plaintiff must have "cognitive aware-
ness."'7 No such damages could be recovered by a comatose person.
What level of cognition is necessary so that a person might be held to
have "cognitive awareness" is nevertheless obviously a difficult matter.
The difficulty was highlighted in the dissent's submission that the award
of substantial sums for pain and suffering to people with very slight
awareness of their predicament, which the majority recognized would be
permissible, can hardly be said to give effect to the policy considerations
underlying the court's decision-are these second order principles or the
original principle in different guise?-that general damages in negligence
cases should have some "meaning or utility to the injured person."'8 The
majority recognized the validity of the objection but declared that consid-
erations of efficiency of application precluded the adoption of a more
fine-tuned test. Whether or not one agrees with the principles adopted
by the majority, its response to the dissent's argument seems fair enough.
Every general principle will confront cases in which its application will
run at cross purposes with its aspirations, and this feature is not by itself a
conclusive reason either to abandon the principle or even necessarily to
refuse to apply it in those cases. The real world is not such a neat and
tidy place.
A second preliminary observation is that many of the objections to the
use of particular principles in the decision of tort cases arise from over-
simplified characterizations of the facts of particular cases that end up by
making legal disputes into verbal disputes. For example, a much more
important principle of modem tort law than the one at stake in McDou-
gald v. Garber, and one to which I devote a great deal of attention in the
succeeding portions of this article, is the principle that both the question
of fault-where that is in issue-and the question of causation, in modern
tort law, should be governed by foreseeability. The late Dean Prosser
attacked the use of the concept of foreseeability, as applied to questions
of legal causation, on the ground that "[i]n one sense, almost nothing is
entirely unforeseeable, since there is a very slight mathematical chance,
recognizable in advance, that even the most freakish accident which is
possible will occur, particularly if it has ever happened in history
before." 9 Prosser's objection, that the foreseeability test "lacks all clarity
and precision," 10 reminds one of the similar criticisms made by Judge
Friendly in 1964 in In re Kinsman Transit Co.,1 where he commented
that some American courts had applied the foreseeability test so as to
6. 536 N.E.2d 372 (1989).
7. Id. at 375.
8. Id. at 378.
9. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 267 (4th ed. 1971).
10. Id.
11. 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965).
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"extend that concept to such unforeseen lengths as to raise serious doubt
whether the concept is meaningful.' 2 The case cited to support this as-
sertion was In re Guardian Casualty Co.,13 in which, to quote Judge
Friendly,
the majority gravely asserted that a foreseeable consequence of driv-
ing a taxicab too fast was that a collision with another car would
project the cab against a building with such force as to cause a por-
tion of the building to collapse twenty minutes later, when the cab
was being removed, and injure a spectator twenty feet away. Surely
this is 'straining the idea of foreseeability past the breaking point,'
... at least if the matter be viewed as of the time of the negligent act,
as the supposedly symmetrical test of The Wagon Mound demands
14
Judge Friendly's strictures notwithstanding, the example he gives does
not support the conclusion at which he wishes to arrive. First of all, any
concept will of course present some difficulties in application. As we
have already noted, this by itself is not a sufficient reason to reject it.
Furthermore, the case he mentions is not at all bizarre. Of course, if one
had to foresee the exact manner in which every accident occurred or the
exact person who would be injured, very few things would be antece-
dently "foreseeable." But, in the type of case that Judge Friendly posited,
surely it is foreseeable that a motor vehicle that travels too rapidly in an
urban setting might crash into the side of a building, and it is surely fore-
seeable that the crash itself might dislodge some of the bricks in the
building, or that, in the process of extracting a vehicle that has embedded
itself in a structure, some bricks might be displaced that would then fall
on pedestrians. If one characterizes the situation as I have-which not
only does not seem unfair but also seems to conform to what common
sense would suggest-then the accident seems neither bizarre nor unu-
sual and certainly not unforeseeable ex ante. The problems with a fore-
seeability test to which I shall now turn are, however, not of this order
and cannot be removed by a more careful statement of the factual issues
before the court.
II. THE MODERN ODYSSEY OF THE FORESEEABLE
PRINCIPLE
A. BRITISH CASES ON ECONOMIC Loss
Once it became generally settled in England, as in the United States,
that, at least in some circumstances, recovery could be had for the eco-
nomic loss suffered as a consequence of negligent misrepresentation, 15
the question arose whether "pure" economic loss might be recoverable in
12. Id. at 724.
13. 2 N.Y.S.2d 232, affid, 16 N.E.2d 397 (1938).
14. Kinsman, 338 F.2d at 724-25 n.10 (citation omitted).
15. See Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd., 1964 App. Cas. 465 (1963);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
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other types of actions based on a negligence theory. For my purposes, the
judgment of the Court of Appeal in Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin
& Co. (Contractors) Ltd.16 is a convenient starting point for examining
the flurry of judicial and scholarly concern, which is only now beginning
to subside, with the issue of when economic loss may be recovered.
Although some of the leading cases are well-known, at least in England,
it may be helpful to set out briefly the evolution of British judicial think-
ing on the legal principles that should govern legal development in this
area.
In Spartan Steel, the defendants' employees severed a power cable.
The plaintiffs, who were the owners of a nearby factory, incurred some
physical damage when molten metal in their furnaces cooled. The de-
fendants conceded that they were liable for this damage. The plaintiffs,
however, also sought to recover the lost profits they would have made if
they could have fabricated the metal that was spoiled and sold it as fin-
ished goods. They further sought recovery for the lost profits for metal
that they would have been able to melt and fabricate during the time that
their factory was inoperative due to the defendants' negligence. The trial
court allowed recovery of all requested items of damages. The defend-
ants appealed the portion of the trial court's judgment that allowed any
damages for lost profits. The Court of Appeal allowed the claim for lost
profits on the metal that was damaged, but a majority of the court denied
recovery for any other loss of profits during the period that the factory
was inoperative owing to absence of electric power. Lord Denning, M.R.,
found unhelpful analyses that would deny recovery for lost profits on the
basis that there was either "no duty" or that the damage was "too re-
mote." He thought that such tests should be discarded and that the time
had come "to consider the particular relationship in hand, and see
whether or not, as a matter of [public] policy, economic loss should be
recoverable.' 7 He thus concluded that the lost profits on the metal that
the plaintiffs would have been able to process and fabricate but for the
fact that their power was cut off could not be recovered "because that was
economic loss independent of the physical damage."' 18
Edmund Davies, L.J., dissented on this point. He noted that it was
common ground that the lost profits on the metal that was ruined in the
process of fabrication and the lost profits on the metal that the plaintiffs
were unable to process and fabricate "were equally foreseeable and
equally direct consequences of the defendants' admitted negligence."'19
Admittedly, the former profit was lost as a result of physical damage
done to the material in the furnace when the power was cut off. "But
what," he asked, "has that purely fortuitous fact to do with legal princi-
16. 1973 Q.B. 27 (1972) (Eng. C.A.).
17. Id at 37.
18. Id. at 39. Why he was prepared to allow recovery for the loss of profits on the
metal that was spoiled is an interesting question. Given recent developments that would
seem incorrect.
19. Id. at 41.
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ple?"2 0 In answer to his own question he replied: "In my judgment,
nothing. "21
Whatever the appeal of Lord Denning's conclusion, that whether and
in what circumstances there may be recovery for economic loss must ulti-
mately depend on policy considerations, developments in the House of
Lords soon raised the question whether Lord Denning's approach was in
point of fact the correct one. Anns v. Merton London Borough Coun-
cil,22 decided in 1977, involved a group of plaintiffs who were the long-
term lessees of a group of flats in a housing development that had been
completed in 1962. Two of the plaintiffs were original lessees, but the
others acquired their leases by subsequent assignment. The block of flats
had been constructed with inadequate foundations. The basis of the
claim against the Merton London Borough Council was that its employ-
ees had negligently inspected and approved the foundations that had
been laid by the contractor, although these foundations had not con-
formed to the Council's building code. The House of Lords affirmed the
Court of Appeal's conclusion that, on the facts presented, the plaintiffs
could bring an action in negligence against the Council.
Lord Wilberforce, who delivered the principal speech in Anns, with
which all the other law lords expressed their agreement, declared that an
action for negligence could "only arise when the state of the building is
such that there is present or imminent danger to the health or safety of
persons occupying it."'23 What gave fuel to the controversy with which we
are concerned was not so much this fairly narrow holding, but Lord Wil-
berforce's earlier statement, citing among other authorities Lord Reid's
speech in Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. v. Home Office,24 that, in English law,
"the position has now been reached that in order to establish that a duty
of care arises in a particular situation, it is not necessary to bring the facts
of that situation within those of previous situations in which a duty of
care has been held to exist."'2 5 Instead, Lord Wilberforce thought, one
had to ask two questions. First, was there "a sufficient relationship of
proximity or neighborhood such that... [it was] in the reasonable con-
templation of the [defendant that] carelessness on his part [would] be
likely to cause damage to the [plaintiff]-in which case a prima facie duty
of care arises"?26 Second, if that in fact were the case, one would then
have to consider "whether there are any considerations which ought to
negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of person
to whom it is owed or the damages to which a breach of it may give
rise."'27 Among the examples that he gave of situations where such limi-
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 1978 App. Cas. 728 (1977).
23. Id. at 760.
24. 1970 App. Cas. 1004 (1969).
25. Anns, 1978 App. Cas. at 751.
26. Id. at 751-52.
27. Id. at 752.
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tations might be appropriate was that of negligent misrepresentation. 28
Although Anns involved physical damage to property, Lord Wilber-
force's speech obviously raised the question whether the traditional dis-
tinction between pure economic loss and other sorts of loss was about to
be discarded and replaced by a "more principled" mode of analysis. For
example, in 1981, in Lexmead (Basingstoke) Ltd. v. Lewis, 29 Lord
Diplock, who delivered the only significant speech in the House of Lords,
queried whether a retailer who was obliged to indemnify his buyer for
sums that the buyer had to pay to third parties injured by a negligently
manufactured product might not seek to recover those damages against
the manufacturer with whom the retailer was not in privity of contract.
Lord Diplock raised this query because the Court of Appeal had declared
that the principle of Donoghue v. Stevenson 3 0-under which a party, who
was not in privity of contract with the negligent manufacturer of a prod-
uct, could nevertheless bring an action for damages against the manufac-
turer-did not extend to purely economic loss. Lord Diplock went out of
his way to declare that
[w]hile in the absence of argument it could not be right to express
any final view, I should not wish the dismissal of the ... appeal to be
regarded as an approval by this House of the proposition that where
the economic loss suffered by a distributor.., consists of a liability to
pay damages to the ultimate consumer for physical injuries ... such
economic loss is not recoverable under the Donoghue v. Stevenson
principle from the manufacturer. 31
Lexmead (Basingstoke) Ltd. v. Lewis involved a case where the dam-
age for which indemnity was sought was largely physical injury to the
person, but Lord Diplock's ruminations certainly could be taken as fur-
ther evidence of the siren call of a single general principle governing lia-
bility for negligence and, in particular, of the principle that liability
should be determined by "reasonable foreseeability." In fact, this is the
position that the House of Lords seemed to be in the process of adopting
the very next year, in 1982, when it decided Junior Books Ltd. v. Veitchi
Co. Ltd.32 In that case, the defendant was a subcontractor who had in-
stalled a defective floor in a factory. The owner of the factory was per-
mitted to bring an action sounding in negligence, not only for the cost of
correcting the defect but also for the loss of profits suffered as a result,
despite the lack of privity of contract. There was no allegation that the
defective flooring created any danger to life or limb or to any other physi-
cal property. Except for a lone dissenter, all of their lordships in Junior
Books expressed agreement with the speech of Lord Roskill. To the ar-
28. The House of Lords had, of course, declared that an action for negligent misrepre-
sentation might be brought, even in the absence of some "special relationship," Hedley
Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd., 1964 App. Cas. 465 (1963), but had not yet
spelled out, and may perhaps still not have (see infra note 52), the limits of that liability.
29. 1982 App. Cas. 225 (1981).
30. 1932 App. Cas. 56 (1932) (appeal taken from Scot.).
31. Lexmead, 1982 App. Cas. at 278.
32. [1983] 1 App. Cas. 520 (1982) (appeal taken from Scot.).
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gument that allowing recovery in such cases would "open the floodgates,"
Lord Roskill responded that, although "policy considerations have from
time to time been allowed to play their part in the tort of negligence since
it first developed ... yet today I think its scope is best determined by
considerations of principle rather than of policy."'33 He cited, with ap-
proval, the speeches of Lord Reid in Dorset Yacht and of Lord Wilber-
force in Anns. Applying the criteria laid down by Lord Wilberforce in
Anns to the facts before him, he saw "nothing whatsoever to restrict the
duty of care arising from the proximity of which I have spoken. ' 34 In
dissent, Lord Brandon of Oakbrook argued that the only duty the sub-
contractor had to the owner of the factory was to install the flooring so as
to insure that there was no danger to persons or property, excluding the
property in question, i.e., the floor itself.35
Lord Roskill in Junior Books also cited a number of Commonwealth
cases of which the most well-known is Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v.
The Dredge "Willemstad.' 36 In that case, the dredge had damaged a
pipeline that was owned by an oil refining company that connected the
refinery with an oil terminal owned by the plaintiff on the other side of
the bay. The owner of the terminal depended upon the pipeline to re-
ceive oil from the refinery. The High Court of Australia held that the
owner of the terminal was entitled to recover its expenses in finding alter-
nate means of getting oil to its terminal.37
The apparent triumph of the principle of foreseeability in the economic
loss cases was foreshadowed a few months previously in McLoughlin v.
O'Brian.38 In McLoughlin, the House of Lords allowed recovery of dam-
ages for emotional stress by a mother who had not physically witnessed
the serious injury to her children and husband in an automobile accident,
but first saw them a few hours later in a dazed and battered condition in
the hospital where she was also informed that one of the children had
been killed. The most interesting speeches were those of Lord Scarman
and of Lord Bridge of Harwich, who concluded that, with regard to the
question of the limits of liability for the infliction of nervous shock, there
were "no policy considerations sufficient to justify limiting the liability of
negligent tortfeasors by reference to some narrower criterion than that of
reasonable foreseeability. ''39 In an ironic twist, Lord Bridge of Harwich
expressed regret that Lord Edmund-Davies, as he now was, whose dis-
sent in Spartan Steel was the starting point of our discussion, criticized his
conclusion. Not only did Lord Edmund-Davies criticize Lord Bridge of
Harwich's conclusion, he also rather pointedly disagreed with the conclu-
33. Id. at 539.
34. Id. at 546.
35. Id at 549.
36. 136 C.L.R. 529 (1976) (Austl.). This case pre-dated Anns but was not cited in it.
37. The High Court tried to limit the sweep of its decision by declaring that reasonable
foreseeability of economic loss was not enough. There had to be a sufficient relationship of
"proximity" between the parties. Id. at 574-75 (Stephen, J.); cf. id. at 553-56 (Gibbs, J.).
38. [1983] 1 App. Cas. 410 (1982).
39. Id. at 443.
[Vol. 49
PRINCIPLE IN TORT LAW
sion of Lord Scarman, who in a brief speech expressing his agreement
with Lord Bridge of Harwich asked, "Why then should not the courts
draw the line, as the Court of Appeal [which denied recovery on policy
grounds] manfully tried to do in this case?" 40 To which question Lord
Scarman declared, "[s]imply, because the policy issue as to where to draw
the line is not justiciable. The problem is one of social, economic, and
financial policy. The considerations relevant to a decision are not such as
to be capable of handling within the limits of the forensic process."' 41 To
which Lord Edmund-Davies replied that this proposition was "as novel as
it is startling. '42 He found it novel because it had never been mentioned
in argument and "startling because in my respectful judgment it runs
counter to well-established and wholly acceptable law."'43
Junior Books turned out to be the crest of the attempt to "rationalize"
the law of tort concerning the recovery of economic damages by applica-
tion of the "reasonable foreseeability" principle. The first retreat took
place in Governors of the Peabody Donation Fund v. Sir Lindsay Parkin-
son & Co.,44 a case very similar to Anns but with one, as it turned out,
significant difference: the plaintiff was a foundation, not a group of indi-
vidual homeowners. In denying recovery, Anns was distinguished on pre-
cisely those grounds.45 The following year in Candlewood Navigation
Corp. v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd.,46 a time charterer sought to recover the
economic loss sustained when the ship it had chartered had to be taken
out of service for repairs after a collision with the defendant's negligently
navigated vessel. Although the case arose in Australia, the Privy Council
refused to accept the reasoning of the Australian judges in the Caltex
case. Instead, citing English precedent and Justice Holmes' opinion in
the Robins Drydock case, 47 the Privy Council reaffirmed the traditional
view that the time charterer could not recover its economic loss. The
proposition that a person with no physical property that was damaged
could not recover in tort for economic loss consequent to the damage of
property owned by another was soon thereafter reaffirmed by the House
of Lords. 48
While these developments were taking place in Great Britain, the
United States Supreme Court in East River S.S. Corp. v. TransAmerica
40. Id. at 431.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 427. Lord Edmund-Davies nevertheless supported the decision to allow re-
covery in the case because, on policy grounds, he reached a different conclusion than the
Court of Appeal.
43. Id. In a subsequent case, their lordships were able to avoid ruling on whether the
principle of foreseeability would enable someone who saw a disaster "live" on television to
recover against the culpable party by reliance on the practice of the television authorities
not to show pictures of suffering by recognizable individuals. Alcock v. Chief Constable of
So. Yorkshire Police, [19921 1 App. Cas. 310 (1991).
44. 1985 App. Cas. 210 (1984).
45. Id. at 234.
46. 1986 App. Cas. I (P.C. 1985) (appeal taken from N.S.W.).
47. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
48. Leigh & Sillavan Ltd. v. Aliakmon Shipping Co., [1986] 1 App. Cas. 785 (1986).
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Delaval, Inc. ,49 held that damages for economic loss cannot be awarded in
a product liability action brought in admiralty regardless of whether the
action was brought under a strict liability theory or a negligence theory.
The plaintiffs in that case had entered into long-term bare-boat charters
of tankers that turned out to have defective turbines. The plaintiffs were
not only unable to recover their lost profits while the ships were being
repaired, but also were denied recovery for the cost of repairing the de-
fective engines. The Court was unwilling to displace the operation of
warranty law in an action involving commercial parties. Relying in part
on East River, the House of Lords in 1988 then decided D & F Estates
Ltd. v. Church Commissioners for England,50 a case involving a block of
flats in which the plaster work had been done negligently by one of the
subcontractors. Their Lordships held that, in the absence of a contractual
relationship between the parties, the cost of repairing a defect in physical
property that was discovered before the defect had caused personal in-
jury or physical damage to other property was not recoverable in a negli-
gence action by a remote purchaser or lessee.
Finally, in 1990, the House of Lords was presented with Murphy v.
Brentwood District Council,51 a case even more similar to Anns because
the plaintiff was an individual person who sought recovery for the loss he
suffered in selling his house for a lower price than he would have received
had it not been in a defective condition. The trial court specifically found
that, in its defective state, the house had posed an imminent danger to
plaintiff during the time he occupied it. In reversing the judgment of the
Court of Appeal, which in turn had affirmed the trial court's award of
damages, the House of Lords held that Anns had been wrongly decided
and that the subsequent cases relying upon it should be overruled. Lord
Keith of Kinkel, with whose speech all the other law lords expressed
agreement, expressly declared that "although the damage in Anns was
characterized as physical damage by Lord Wilberforce, it was purely eco-
nomic loss. ' '52 Lord Keith of Kinkel concluded:
It is clear that Anns did not proceed upon any basis of established
principle, but introduced a new species of liability governed by a
principle indeterminate in character but having the potentiality of
covering a wide range of situations, involving chattels as well as real
property, in which it had never hitherto been thought that the law of
negligence had any proper place.53
He noted that the logical implication of what he thought was "a some-
what superficial examination of principle" in the Anns case was a "colli-
sion with long established principles regarding liability in the tort of
49. 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
50. [1989] 1 App. Cas. 177 (1988).
51. [1991] 1 App. Cas. 398 (1990).
52. Id. at 466.
53. Id. at 471.
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negligence for economic loss."'54
With the decision of Murphy, the Duke of York had seemingly re-
turned to the bottom of the hill. Given this history, British scholars have
asserted, with particular reference to the House of Lords' decisions in
Caparo Industries PLC v. Dickman,55 a negligent misrepresentation case,
and Alcock v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire,56 an emotional distress
case, that the only general principle recognized by the House of Lords for
organizing the extent of liability in negligence cases is that of "proxim-
ity," a concept that is lacking in substance. 57 In a more recent case, for
example, the House of Lords held in Spring v. Guardian Life Insurance
PLC5 8 that a former employee could bring an action against his former
employer for the negligent preparation of a letter of reference that, but
for the defense of qualified privilege, could have been the basis of an
action for libel. Lord Keith of Kinkel dissented on the ground that the
law of defamation should not be superseded by resort to the law of negli-
gent misrepresentation, a position for which, I must confess, I have con-
siderable sympathy. The majority, nevertheless, held to the contrary and
relied on a m6lange of factors, such as foreseeability, proximity, public
policy, conceptions of fairness, etc.
Unlike, perhaps, the British authors, I see no reason why cases involv-
ing the types of economic loss that are the principal focus of this article
need necessarily be decided by the same considerations as those gov-
erning recovery for negligent misrepresentation, let alone those gov-
erning recovery for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. I thus
would not disagree with those who assert that the alternatives to reason-
able foreseeability are even more unsatisfactory. My point, rather, is that
the attempt to establish a single general principle of liability for all negli-
gent actions has shown itself to be as hopeless as it is, in my judgment,
unwise. As to the hopelessness of the task, consider two even more re-
cent decisions of the House of Lords.
In the first, it was held, with two dissents, that a solicitor, who negli-
gently delayed preparing a new will until the testator died, was liable to
the disappointed prospective beneficiaries on the grounds that the solici-
54. Id. The Murphy case was then applied in Department of the Env't v. Thomas
Bates & Son, Ltd., [1991] 1 App. Cas. 499 (1990). Some Commonwealth courts have, how-
ever, refused to follow Murphy and have continued to allow recovery against local govern-
mental authorities in defective housing cases. See I.N. Duncan Wallace, No Somersault
after Murphy: New Zealand Follows Canada, 111 LAW Q. REV. 285 (1995).
55. [1990] 2 App. Cas. 605 (1990). Their Lordships held that shareholders who bought
additional shares of a company on the basis of a negligently prepared auditor's report
could not bring an action against the auditors. For a glimpse at the uncertainties of the
extent of liability for negligent misrepresentation in American law, compare the California
Court of Appeals' decision in International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy
Corp., 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (Ct. App. 1986), with the later decision of the California Supreme
Court in Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
56. [1992] 1 App. Cas. 310 (1991). The case is discussed supra at note 43.
57. See Jenny Steele, Skepticism and the Law of Negligence, 52 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 437
(1993); see also Howarth, supra note 5.
58. [1993] 3 W.L.R. 354 (H.L.).
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tor had assumed a responsibility to them to act with reasonable care and
that, since the testator was dead, if the beneficiaries could not bring an
action, there was no other possible way in which the solicitor's failure to
exercise reasonable care could be redressed. 59 A few months later, how-
ever, a majority of their Lordships held that a surveyor who negligently
altered his report to allow a ship to sail with only temporary repairs, in-
stead of the permanent repairs he had previously recommended, had not
assumed any such responsibility to the owners of the ship's cargo when
the temporary repairs failed and the ship sank.60 Their Lordships noted
that maritime transactions were accompanied by complex commercial
and insurance arrangements and concluded that it would be "unfair, un-
just and unreasonable" 61 to impose liability upon the classification society
who had supplied the surveyor.
B. AMERICAN CASES ON ECONOMIc Loss
The same urge to resolve the question of whether economic loss can be
recovered in a tort action by subsuming it under the broader principle of
reasonable foreseeability was of course felt in the United States. A small
minority of state courts did in fact hold that, in product liability actions,
what might be called pure economic loss was indeed recoverable. 62 Nev-
ertheless, over time, even these courts had difficulty with this doctrine.
For example, after first holding that a retail purchaser of what was de-
scribed as "Grade #1" carpet was able to recover the cost of replacing
that carpet from the manufacturer who was several steps removed from
the retail purchaser in the distribution scheme and of whose name the
purchaser was unaware at the time of purchase,63 the New Jersey
Supreme Court subsequently refused to apply that doctrine in an action
that involved "commercial" parties. 64
The problems with the foreseeability principle are more starkly re-
vealed in the contortions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in In re Kinsman Transit Co.65 That case involved the liability
arising from the following almost comically bizarre set of facts. A Great
Lakes grain ship, over four hundred feet long, was moored for the winter
in the Buffalo River, which runs through Buffalo, New York, into Lake
Erie. Through the combined negligence of those in charge of the wharf,
59. [19951 2 W.L.R. 187 (H.L.) (Lord Keith of Kinkel and Lord Mustill were the
dissenters).
60. Marc Rich & Co. v. Bishop Rock Marine Co., [1995] 3 All E.R. 307 (H.L.) (Lord
Lloyd of Berwick dissented).
61. Id. at 332 (per Lord Steyn with whose speech all the members of the majority
agreed).
62. See, e.g., Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305, 312 (N.J. 1965); Ok-
senholt v. Lederle Labs., 656 P.2d 293, 296-97 (Or. 1982); City of La Crosse v. Schubert,
Schroeder & Assocs., 240 N.W.2d 124, 127 (Wis. 1976). See also J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory,
598 P.2d 60, 64-65 (Cal. 1979), a case very like Junior Books.
63. Santor, 207 A.2d at 314.
64. Spring Motors Distribs. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660 (N.J. 1985).
65. 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965).
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who failed to properly maintain the deadman, and the ship's watchman,
the ship broke her moorings and struck and dislodged another even
longer ship. Both ships drifted down the river until they lodged in a draw
bridge that, owing to the negligence of the bridge keepers, was only par-
tially raised by the time the ships reached it. Since the channel was only
177 feet wide at this point, the two ships wedged into the bridge and
formed a dam in the ice-choked stream that flooded riparian property for
three miles back up the river to the starting point of the tragi-comedy.
A majority of the Second Circuit was prepared to allow all of the ripa-
rian owners whose property had been flooded to recover. Certainly, to
my mind, all these damages were foreseeable consequences of a ship of
that size breaking loose from her moorings in an ice-choked river. Never-
theless, the second time the case reached the Court of Appeals,66 it held
that there was no liability for the economic loss suffered by, among
others, those parties whose claim was that, with the river closed to navi-
gation, they were unable to move grain they were contractually bound to
deliver to the appropriate dock. Judge Kaufman, however, did not want
to rely on the traditional distinction between economic loss and physical
loss, which would have easily disposed of the case despite the fact that it
would have been difficult to argue that these damages were not reason-
ably foreseeable consequences of the original negligence. In denying re-
covery, Judge Kaufman held that the connection between the defendants'
negligence and the plaintiffs' damages was "too tenuous and remote" to
permit recovery. "In the final analysis," he declared, "the circumlocution
whether posed in terms of 'foreseeability,' 'duty,' 'proximate cause,' 're-
moteness,' etc. seems unavoidable." 67 He concluded by quoting from
Judge Andrews' dissenting opinion in the Palsgraft8 case that "'[i]t is all a
question of expediency . . . of fair judgment.' 69 Whether this was a
more satisfying basis for deciding the case than simply dismissing the
claims because they were pure economic loss is another matter. The sub-
sequent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in East River
Steamship Corp.70 indicates that, in admiralty cases, such as In re Kins-
man Transit Co., the Court at least is content with the traditional
distinction.
66. In re Kinsman Transit Corp., 388 F.2d 821, 824-25 (2d Cir. 1968).
67. Id. at 825.
68. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
69. 388 F.2d at 825 (quoting Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 104). In Union Oil Co. v. Oppen,
501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974), an oil spill case, Judge Sneed also expressed dissatisfaction
with the traditional exclusion of recovery for economic loss but then tried to limit the reach
of his decision recognizing liability to commercial fishermen for whom there were prece-
dents for allowing recovery on a public nuisance theory. Certainly the losses of resort
hotels, which Judge Sneed seemed to want to exclude, are as foreseeable as those of com-
mercial fishermen. Id. at 570.
70. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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C. OTHER AMERICAN EXPERIMENTS WITH THE FORESEEABILITY
PRINCIPLE
The attempt to find easily articulable and clear statements of principle
which supposedly provide for the "just" resolution of cases is, of course,
not confined to the maneuverings concerning the issue of recovery for
economic loss. An area that, at least in the United States, is giving rise to
the same sorts of intellectual fumbling is that concerning so-called deriva-
tive actions. Examination of one such instance, which was also driven at
least in part by notions of reasonable foreseeability, may be helpful. In
Wyco v. Gnodtke,71 the Supreme Court of Michigan held that the loss of
companionship of a minor child was a compensable item of damages
under Michigan's then existing version of Lord Campbell's Act, under
which recoverable damages were limited to "pecuniary damages." A few
years later in 1970, however, the Supreme Court of Michigan reconsid-
ered the issue,72 and the law returned to its pre-Wycko state, in which loss
of companionship was not considered "pecuniary" damage. In 1971 the
Michigan legislature responded by enacting legislation, effective March
30, 1972, specifically permitting recovery for loss of society and compan-
ionship in wrongful death actions. When confronted with the question of
what happened with regard to cases that had commenced before March
30, 1972, the Michigan Supreme Court then held that its decision retreat-
ing from Wycko was in error.73
Subsequent to this minuet, the Supreme Court of Michigan in Berger v.
Weber74 was confronted with the issue of whether a minor child could
recover for the loss of the society and companionship of its mother who
had been injured but not killed in an automobile accident. The court held
that it could and relied on the fact that, under the wrongful death statute,
children, as we have just seen, could recover for the loss of society and
companionship of a parent who had been killed in such an accident.
Given the existing judicial and legislative policies of the state of Michi-
gan, the court concluded that it was only proper that a child's action for
the loss of society and companionship of an injured parent should be
recognized.
A few years later, however, the Michigan Supreme Court was con-
fronted with the question of whether a parent could bring an action for
the loss of the society and companionship of a child that had been injured
but not killed. Perhaps to the surprise of some, and the delight of those
who felt that the decision recognizing the child's action was unwise, the
court refused to allow an action by the parents for the loss of the consor-
tium of an injured child.75 The court specifically held that "[f]orseeability
71. 105 N.W.2d 118 (Mich. 1960).
72. Breckon v. Franklin Fuel Co., 174 N.W.2d 836 (Mich. 1970).
73. Smith v. City of Detroit, 202 N.W.2d 300, 303-04 (Mich. 1972).
74. 303 N.W.2d 424 (Mich. 1981).
75. Sizemore v. Smock, 422 N.W.2d 666 (Mich. 1988).
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of injury alone does not mandate recognition of a cause of action. ' 76 Fac-
tors such as the explosion in liability costs and the burdens imposed on
the courts from multiplying the actions that can arise from a single acci-
dent have to be considered. The two dissenters argued that there was no
principled way to distinguish the parents' cause of action, which the
Court refused to recognize, from the child's cause of action that had pre-
viously been upheld. At least one member of the majority agreed with
this latter point and argued that the Berger case should be overruled.
Here again, we see a court determined to see legal development firmly
established on the basis of "principle" forced to retreat and, in this in-
stance, to leave the law in an even more chaotic state than that in which
the court had found it.
III. THE ROLE OF PRINCIPLE IN TORT LAW
Where does all this leave us? One could continue to maintain that tort
law should be directed by clear statements of principle but that the princi-
ple of reasonable foreseeability is not the correct one. Or, one could in-
sist that the principle of reasonable foreseeability is the correct principle,
but that the courts have made a hash of it. I do not think either of these
alternatives will work. To my mind the principle of "reasonable foresee-
ability" is a good one; it just cannot do all the work that is demanded of
it. Moreover, I am extremely doubtful that any better general principle
of tort liability could be formulated.
The other possible reaction to the confusing farrago is to scrap the
whole exercise. After all, has not Judge Andrews told us that "[i]t is all a
matter of expediency?" 77 To which I would reply, it all depends on what
you mean by "expediency." If by expediency one means "politics"-in
the sense in which that term is used to describe the use of power to
achieve hegemony in society for a particular ideology or economic or
class structure, or, more prosaically, of using power to advance partisan
interests, and if the only criterion by which those efforts can be judged is
how successful they are-I would answer no. That is to say, I do not
accept the assertion that the grading of an examination by a professor or
the decision of a case by a judge is the same type of decision as that of a
legislature, on the eve of an election, on how to allocate construction
funds among competing public work projects.
I am not so naive as to believe that factors such as sex, race, and per-
sonal advancement never influence judicial decision-makers. No matter
how hard a decision-maker may try, he can never be certain that he is not
unconsciously influenced by factors such as these, but the whole point of
a system of law is to force the decision-maker to justify his decision ac-
cording to some legally relevant criteria. In a previous piece, I have ar-
gued that a system of strict liability for the miscarriage of an ultra-
76. Id. at 671.
77. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 104 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
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hazardous or abnormally dangerous activity that focuses only on the de-
gree of danger of the activity and the commonness of the activity is differ-
ent from one in which the social importance of the activity is stated to be
a factor of equal value.78 It is not that the question of the social impor-
tance of the activity will not influence a decision-maker operating under
the former system but that such a decision-maker must be able to make a
plausible argument that the activity is or is not highly dangerous, whereas
a decision-maker under the latter system is not so confined. It is this
narrowing of discretion, to which I am certainly not opposed, that is the
essence of the rule of law, and the desire so to limit discretion is certainly
one of the major attractions of the resort to principle.
There is, however, another view of expediency, one that sees the term
as a reference to what, at least since Aristotle, is called cpp6vritcq or, in
English, practical wisdom. I would like to think that this is what Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. had at least partially in mind when he said that
"[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. '79 Under
this view, principles are not ends in themselves; they are merely devices
by which human beings seek to achieve the good life. The goals and val-
ues of life are many and diverse. They are often incompatible, as even
modern natural lawyers recognize and yet do not feel that they are being
unprincipled in so doing.80 Principles are useful, even essential, but they
are not ultimates. If this type of deliberation is what Judge Andrews had
in mind when he said that "[i]t is all a matter of expediency," then he has
pointed us in the right direction.
A complex normative system like the law, that is inescapably inter-
twined with the sometimes contradictory morality of the society in which
it operates, requires those who function as officials of that legal system to
make choices. The choices these officials make are constrained by no-
tions of consistency-the need to articulate convincing reasons of why
two cases are dissimilar; by notions of what Aquinas and the natural law-
yers call "the common good"; by notions of efficiency of administration;
and by many other considerations including the sorts of principles that
torts scholars discuss. As already noted, the law does of course strive to
make certain factors (such as, normally, the parties' race or sex) inappro-
priate for consideration. But to try to make decisions of complex cases
depend solely on the application of some single "principle" to the exclu-
sion of all other factors is as unwise as it is unachievable. To try to sim-
plify the process by trying to reduce the choices involved in deciding a
case to the application of a verbal formula, such as the principle of rea-
sonable foreseeability, may seem comforting to some but in the end, as
we have seen, leads to inconsistent decisions, which only serve to rein-
force the cynicism that the appeal to principle was designed to avert. It is
not that the verbal formulas thus far chosen were inadequate; it is, rather,
78. George C. Christie, An Essay on Discretion, 1986 DUKE L.J. 747, 764-72.
79. HOLMES, supra note 3, at 1.
80. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RiGHTs 81-125 (1980).
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that the whole enterprise was doomed from the start. Social life is too
rich in complicated details to permit resort to these kinds of overriding
abstractions. The best common-law judges have always known this, and
their decisions reflect the exercise of seasoned judgment.
If, perhaps under the influence of Ronald Dworkin,81 one insists that
the law is driven by normative principles that determine the "correct"
decision of particular cases, then Lord Scarman's sharp distinction, in Mc-
Loughlin v. O'Brian,82 between principle and policy sounds plausible and
Lord Edmund-Davies' insistence that policy has always played a role in
the development of the law appears as merely the sad and regrettable
reflection of the fact that this is, after all, not the best of all possible
worlds. This is unfortunate. If one abandons the illusory insistence that
legal development must respond to a single or at most a limited number
of principles with normative sweep, then Lord Scarman's stark distinction
between principles and economic and social policy disappears. Are not
the propositions that economic loss should be left to the contractual ar-
rangements worked out by the parties in the light of commercial law, or
that economic loss should be insured against by the parties concerned,
every bit as much statements of principle as the proposition that, in the
law of torts, the range of interests that are eligible for compensation
should be determined by the principle of reasonable foreseeability?
Indeed, the insistence that the foreseeability be "reasonable" is itself
capable of bringing in these other factors. "Reasonable" foreseeability
has been held to include more than the likelihood of injury; it includes
factors such as the burden on the defendant of changing his practices in
the light of the foreseeable risk. 83 Why cannot the notion of reasonable-
ness with regard to foreseeability include the social judgment that it is
unreasonable to expect the tortfeasor to worry about the pure economic
loss that his conduct may cause as, a result of the physical damage his
conduct may cause to third parties? To some extent, the law already does
that. As far as I know, no court has held that, if X negligently injures a
famous football player, X would be liable in an action brought by the
football player's employer for the loss suffered because fewer people
bought tickets to the games. Like the loss in Anns and its progeny, this
loss of profits is much more foreseeable than the damage for fire loss
81. It does not strike me as mere coincidence that a collection of Dworkin's essays in
which he continually espoused the primacy of principle and the difference between princi-
ple and policy-RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977)-had achieved
great notoriety by the time Junior Books and McLoughlin v. O'Brian were decided in 1982.
In Law's Empire, Dworkin makes frequent reference to the McLoughlin case and makes
clear his preference for the "principled" approach taken by Lord Scarman and Lord
Bridge of Harwich. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
82. [1983] 1 App. Cas. 410 (1982).
83. This, after all, is what Wagon Mound II was all about. Overseas Tankship (U.K.)
Ltd. v. The Miller Steamship Co., Pty. (Wagon Mound II), [1967] 1 App. Cas. 617 (P.C.
1966) (appeal taken from N.S.W.). See, in particular, id. at 641-44, where the Privy Coun-
cil incorporated into the reasonable foreseeability test the factors highlighted by Judge
Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1984).
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recovered in Wagon Mound II. But that does not mean that the law must
allow recovery in tort for these losses.
Under the reading that I have suggested, of course, the term "reason-
able foreseeability" no longer refers to an overriding normative principle
driving the decision of concrete cases but refers rather to a mnemonic
device for insuring that, in the decision of difficult cases, the decision-
maker makes an appropriately informed choice, a choice that can never
be mechanical but must always be governed, as well as constrained, by
considerations of consistency84 and of fairness, and, if you will, by consid-
eration of principle in the broader sense in which I have used that term.
In this broader sense there is of course an important place for principle in
tort law. Who could argue that there is not? The problems arise when
one asks too much of principles.
Whether or not one is prepared to accept such a broad reading of the
notion of reasonable foreseeability, history amply illustrates that the at-
tempt to confine the development of tort law to the application of one
overriding normative principle, which insulates the decision-maker from
the responsibility for making difficult choices, is the pursuit of a chimera.
It inevitably leads to the inconsistent and sometimes incoherent develop-
ment of the case law that, ironically, the appeal to principle is designed to
avoid.
84. In my own work I have stressed the importance of consistency among cases and
have asserted that it is easier to decide whether two or more cases are significantly differ-
ent from each other than to reach agreement on the single principle or rule under which
they should be subsumed. See George C. Christie, Objectivity in the Law, 78 YALE L.J.
1311 (1969). I discussed some of the broader implications of this thesis in LAW, NORMS &
AUTHORITY (1982). There is a good related discussion by Raz in which he stresses that
what he calls "local coherence" is about all one can expect of a legal system. Joseph Raz,
The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REv. 273 (1992). Law, he asserts, is based on
authority and involves choices among incommensurate values. Like morality, it can never
achieve "global coherence." Id.; see also Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy,
Objectivity, and Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 549 (1993).
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